Warren Samuels both points out and illustrates in the essay that concludes this volume. Indeed, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to discern among them.
It would not be exaggerating the case to say that the theory and analysis of the economic role of government is the most broad-based, nuanced, and heterogeneous stream of economic thinking. In part because of this, there are countless entrées into the study of this subject: the view of the appropriate role for government espoused by individuals or schools and comparative studies of the same; the evolution of views over time and the underlying reasons for it; varieties of approaches to the subject within particular schools of thought; the evolution of particular aspects of the theory (e.g., regulation, taxation); the role of internal (e.g., tools) and external (e.g., contemporary events) factors in the development of ideas; the role of ideology; positive versus normative analysis; the determination of the role ascribed to government within the economic system (e.g., apriorist versus "theoretically derived"); the impact of service in government on attitudes toward this question; the effect of the general gestalt in which economists live; the modeling of governmental behavior; the efficacy of markets versus government; policy instruments (e.g., law, direct regulation, taxation); the role of implicit assumptions in models of the economic role of government; sophisticated versus naive formulations of particular approaches. A number of these themes are evidenced in the present volume, and the reader can doubtless think of many more.
As such, it comes as no surprise that the evolution of economists' views of the policy process, the economic role of government, and related ideas has been the focus of a not insignificant body of scholarship by those working in the history of economics. Yet there has been no broad-based integrated study, no magisterial treatment (to use Mark Perlman's term) of this subject. We have the treatises on the classical theory of economic policy by Lionel Robbins (1952) and by Warren Samuels (1966) , articles and bits in textbooks examining the stances of individual authors or perhaps juxtaposing the views of two or three authors or attempting to make sense of a particular "school," but practically nothing has been done by way of pulling out and juxtaposing larger themes in the evolution of thought and attempting to trace the forces that account for the development of ideas across schools and epochs. 1
Nor does the present volume fill this gap. The goal that Peter Boettke and I had in putting together this conference was more simple: to bring together a group of scholars with substantial interest and expertise in this subject who would take on the subject from a variety of perspectivesbringing to the table new ideas, perspectives, and topics in a way that would add both breadth and depth to this literature. Of course, the challenge here was to do so in a way that resulted in a conference that would be useful for the participants and a conference volume that was sufficiently thematic. These concerns led us to emphasize the period from the mid-nineteenth century onward-not because we had a particular interest in that period over others but because that is the period dealt with by the bulk of the best proposals we received. But then, given that the postclassical period is relatively underanalyzed in the literature as compared with the classical one, and as much of the most innovative work in our subject at present is being done on this period, perhaps this should not come as a surprise.
Political Economy, Old and New
The volume leads off with an article by Peter Boettke and Steven Horwitz that offers an overarching framework for thinking about the evolution of economists' views on the economic role of government. In Boettke and Horwitz's schema, economists can be thought of as students or saviors of society, while economics as a discipline can be characterized as evidencing epistemic modesty or hubris in its scientific knowledge claims. Boettke and Horwitz then apply this framework to the analysis of the history of development economics from the eighteenth century onward. This framework, while only one of several possible means for naming and framing issues related to the economic role of government, offers an interesting lens through which to view the essays in this volume.
The detailed analysis of the economic role of government really begins with the classical period. And, while much has been written on this subject, contemporary scholarship is causing us to view both the classical literature and its relationship to modern economic analysis in new and interesting ways. The essays by Alain Marciano, Andrew Farrant and Maria Pia Paganelli, Jeffrey Young, and David Levy and Sandra Peart are emblematic of this new scholarship. Marciano and Farrant and Paganelli take on the question of modeling government behavior by taking us back to the work of David Hume. Both essays treat Hume's theory of human nature, its relationship to the modern economic theory of human behavior, and the implications of this for modeling government behavior in modern political economy. One of the interesting things that emerge from these two articles is a good sense for the contingency of the view of government on the underlying assumptions about agent behavior.
The problem of multiple interpretations is evidenced in Jeff Young's examination of the tension in Smith's theory of the state, a tension reflected in his "only three duties" assertions about the role of the sovereign when juxtaposed against the lengthy list of action functions that Smith thought the government should perform. This has led some to characterize Smith as a die-hard advocate of laissez-faire, others to see him as promoting wide-ranging government "interference," and no less a scholar than Lionel Robbins to suggest that Smith's "invisible hand" is actually the state. Young offers a reconciliation of these seemingly inconsistent aspects of Smith's theory of the state, drawing on Smith's discussion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments to suggest an overarching framework grounded in commutative justice, distributive equity, and public utility.
While Marciano and Farrant and Paganelli look forward from the classical tradition to modern political economy, Levy and Peart reverse the lens, applying the notion of "politics as exchange"-the catallactic process at the heart of important strands of modern public choice theory 2 -to the nineteenth-century classical period. Here, though, the political exchange process is grounded in then current notions of sympathy, which have a tempering effect on self-interest and play a prominent role in its translation to the general interest.
New World Economics
The analysis of the American view is almost altogether absent from the extant literature on the economic role of government. Apart from some work on the institutionalists and the more contemporary happenings at Chicago and Virginia, the underanalyzed history of American economics has perhaps its greatest deficit in this area. 3 Yet, as the articles by Stephen 2. This notion actually dates to Richard Whately, despite its really only coming to the fore within economics in the last half century.
3. On aspects of the history of American economics in the twentieth century, see the volume from the 1998 HOPE conference on this topic, From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism (Morgan and Rutherford 1998) . On institutional economics, see both Rutherford 1994 and Meardon, Bradley Bateman, Thomas Leonard, and Malcolm Rutherford demonstrate, there is a rich and underappreciated literature that tells a story very distinct from the British and Continental experiences during this period.
A great deal of the American literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries focused on trade-related issues, and Steve Meardon's essay hones in on one particular facet of that discussion-the protection of intellectual property and its relation to international trading practices. Meardon looks at the relationship between William Cullen Bryant's and Henry C. Carey's respective positions on international copyright and their views of trade policy generally, and their larger perspectives on the role of government in the economy. In the process, Meardon is also able to show that intellectual history sheds a somewhat different light than does economic history on the relationship between intellectual copyright, trade policy, and economic welfare.
Brad Bateman's essay examines the evolution of the doctrine of laissez-faire as the dominant credo in nineteenth-century American popular and economic discourse. Bateman traces the discussion through views of trade, slavery, and labor issues in the first part of the century, to the rise of industrialization and the challenges it posed in the latter part of the century. With this came the beginnings of a challenge to laissez-faire. Specifically, arguments for an increasingly activist role for government developed through what we now call the Social Gospel movement within American Protestantism, informed by the German historical tradition of economic thinking-a process that set the stage for, among other things, the reformist aspects of the Progressive and institutionalist movements on the popular and academic fronts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Tim Leonard picks up the story at the point of the Progressive ascendancy to examine the influence of eugenic ideas on the theory of economic policy during this period. The role of race, eugenics, and related issues in the development of economic ideas has been almost totally unexplored until recently. The work of David Levy and Sandra Peart has confronted this head-on in its British classical and postclassical manifestations, 4 and Leonard's essay here shows how many of these same issues played a role in the American experience as well by informing thought and policy on social reform, particularly issues related to wages and employment that were at the heart of the Progressive agenda. Malcolm Rutherford's piece on Walton Hamilton is very much a case study in the analysis of the economic role of government during the interwar institutionalist ascendancy. Hamilton was an early proponent of the study of law and economics-defined as the interrelations between legal and economic processes-and a pragmatist with a reformist bent. He was neither an unabashed supporter of business nor a proponent of heavy-handed control of business operations. Nor was he of the mind that the answers to the questions of economic policy are likely to be revealed through a priori reasoning. Rather, Hamilton took a case-by-case approach to these issues and, with this, promoted legal-political decision making with the broadest possible range of interests directly represented at the table. Rutherford's discussion also illustrates how Hamilton's analysis both informed and was informed by his extensive participation in governmental affairs, including the New Deal-an activism that was not unique among American economists of that period but which, in degree at least, does distinguish the American economists from their British counterparts.
Applying Doctrine to the Policy Arena
The discussion of the theory of economic policy has for several decades now included references to the virtues and vices of "blackboard economics," a term that Ronald Coase applied to theories that he considered glorious in the world of the blackboard but wholly inapplicable to the world in which we live, and which has subsequently been popularized by Deirdre McCloskey. David Colander puts this debate in historical context by analyzing the views on the theory-policy linkage reflected in John Neville Keynes's distinction between the science and the art of economics, Alfred Marshall and A. C. Pigou's quest for a realistic economic theory, and Abba Lerner's pure theory of economic policy. Colander probes the implications of this for the extent to which one can draw policy conclusions from theory and examines how our teaching of economics reflects these ideas.
Certain of the issues touched on in Colander's discussion bear on the question asked by Yakir Plessner and Warren Young-that of the link between academic economics and economists, and the role of economist as policy adviser and the willingness and ability of economists to translate the theories they teach into the policy arena. The theoretical difficulties pointed to by Colander are amply evidenced by Plessner and Young's examination of the role of economists as policy advisers in Israel from the early 1970s through the mid-1980s and their attempts to deal with the substantial inflationary pressures of the day. The story is not one of success for the market, government, or economists.
Another issue foreshadowed by the theory-policy linkage discussed by Colander and the policy failures analyzed by Plessner and Young is that of coming to grips with what governments and government agents actually do when they make economic policy and the implications of this for understanding and modeling the political element of the policymaking process. The Anglo-Saxon tradition, in both its classical and its marginalist-neoclassical variants, lacked a theory of government behavior. The classical pessimism about "interference" with the market and the neoclassical analysis of efficiency-enhancing government policies were all predicated on a priori views of the state. As Jürgen Backhaus and Richard Wagner point out, the Continental tradition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was rather different, with distinct German, Italian, and Swedish approaches to the analysis of public economics and the political factors that attend it. Backhaus and Wagner bring out both the foundational elements of these Continental approaches and certain of their relations to modern public choice theory.
Both theoretical economics and real-world economies evolved away from laissez-faire ideology over the first half of the twentieth century. Socialism held certain attractions both in theory and in reality, the Cambridge tradition espoused a strongly reformist view of the market process, and, as I have already noted, the American Progressive and institutionalist movements evidenced a strong belief in the ability of government to modify market performance in socially desirable directions. The corporatist movement on the Continent during the interwar period paralleled the increasing calls for a larger role for government management in the British and American capitalist systems during that same period. António Almodovar and José Luís Cardoso look at the rise of corporatist ideas as a third way between the classical-free market and socialist alternatives that had dominated the debates, one that would attempt to overcome some of the limitations of the laissez-faire approach while availing itself of the advantages offered by the market system. They also show how certain aspects of corporatism were enfolded into the Keynesian ideas that emerged in the postwar period.
If the first two-thirds of the twentieth century were dominated by the economist as savior-cum-engineer with increasingly sophisticated models of efficient government policymaking, as Boettke and Horwitz suggest, the last several decades have witnessed something of a reversion to classicism in the reawakening of what Backhouse calls "free market economics." Here, though, we see a more sophisticated modeling of the market process than evidenced in the classical tradition and a more detailed depiction of government behavior than can be found in either the pessimism of the classicals or the optimism of the neoclassicals. Backhouse's essay attempts to address the "why" behind this transformation by examining forces within the profession and without, and how they came together to revolutionize the theory of economic policy and its application on both the macro and micro sides-first in the United States and then throughout much of the West.
Conclusion
Given the enduring importance of the analysis of the economic role of government within the history of economic thought, as well as the still relatively unsettled, or controversial, nature of this issue within contemporary thinking, we believe that this volume is highly topical. In the end, our hope is that it will contribute to an enhanced understanding of the evolution of economists' views about the economic role of government and stimulate new lines of research that build on the ideas suggested in the present essays.
